Explore 12 ship collision investigations from MAIB, NTSB, ATSB and TSB. Learn how lookout, COLREGs, pilotage, bridge teamwork and early action affect safety.
A ship collision rarely develops in an instant. Two vessels may remain in sight or on radar for several minutes while their bridge teams form different views of the risk. A late turn, an unshared pilotage plan, an absent lookout or a misunderstood control mode can close the remaining options.
This article reviews twelve published investigations by the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) and the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB). The cases are selected for their teaching value; they are not ranked by fatalities or damage. Several involve fishing or recreational craft because a collision with a large ship can have severe consequences for people on the smaller vessel.
What does a collision investigation reveal?
A casualty report reconstructs the developing encounter: courses and speeds, lookouts, radar and AIS use, bridge communications, helm and engine orders, pilotage decisions, and the response after impact. Its findings can distinguish an action that caused a collision from a weakness that increased risk without directly causing that particular event.
The IMO’s Casualty Investigation Code establishes a prevention-focused purpose for marine safety investigations. The IMO GISIS Marine Casualties and Incidents module provides another route to casualty information and reports made available to public users. www.imo.org
1. John S McCain and Alnic MC: misunderstood steering control
On 21 August 2017, the US Navy destroyer John S McCain and tanker Alnic MC collided in the Singapore Strait. Ten sailors died and 48 were injured aboard the destroyer. The NTSB found that the crew experienced a perceived loss of steering during a transfer of controls; the steering machinery itself had not failed. Confusion about the control configuration, inadequate procedures and training, and a loss of situation awareness contributed to the collision. Nearby traffic was not warned of the perceived steering emergency. Read the NTSB investigation. ntsb.gov
Safety lesson: Confirm who has steering and propulsion control after every transfer. Practise recovery from control-mode confusion and communicate an unexpected manoeuvring problem promptly.
2. Ever Smart and Alexandra 1: assumptions at a port entrance
In February 2015, the container ship Ever Smart and tanker Alexandra 1 collided at the entrance to Jebel Ali’s approach channel. A pilot was transferring between the outbound and inbound ships. The MAIB found that Ever Smart failed to monitor the tanker’s movement and recognised its proximity only seconds before impact. Alexandra 1 manoeuvred on limited VHF information, without a clear passing understanding shared by everyone involved; the tanker’s AIS was not operating. Read the MAIB investigation. GOV.UK
Safety lesson: At channel entrances and pilot boarding grounds, maintain the traffic picture and confirm passing intentions among the ship, pilot and vessel traffic service.
3. ANL Wyong and King Arthur: fog, AIS and VHF distraction
In August 2018, the container ship ANL Wyong and gas carrier King Arthur collided south-east of Gibraltar in darkness, dense fog and heavy traffic. ANL Wyong was stopped while awaiting a pilot. The MAIB found that neither bridge team appreciated the collision risk soon enough to avoid impact. Expectations about which vessel would keep clear, heavy reliance on AIS information and distracting VHF exchanges affected their decisions. No warning was given from the vessel traffic service area. Read the MAIB investigation. GOV.UK
Safety lesson: In restricted visibility, use radar appropriately, maintain a safe speed and staff the bridge for the conditions. A radio exchange or AIS label cannot establish a safe passing distance by itself.
4. Paula C and Darya Gayatri: an unsupported new officer
In December 2013, the general cargo ship Paula C collided with bulk carrier Darya Gayatri in the Dover Strait traffic separation scheme. The MAIB found that Paula C’s newly qualified second officer had been left on a night watch without support appropriate to his experience and the traffic. After manoeuvring around a fishing vessel, he became overloaded and lost awareness of the developing encounter. Available radar plotting and AIS information were not used effectively. Read the MAIB investigation. GOV.UK
Safety lesson: Set bridge manning according to traffic, visibility and the watchkeeper’s experience. Call for a lookout or the master while there is still time to assess and act.
5. Maersk Shekou and Leeuwin II: a missed helm order in pilotage
In August 2024, Maersk Shekou entered Fremantle Harbour in strong winds and struck the berthed tall ship STS Leeuwin II and the wharf. The ATSB found that the pilot did not order the planned course alteration near the wheel-over point. Tugs and engine power were then used to turn the ship while the helmsman continued trying to maintain the previously ordered heading. The bridge team did not effectively challenge the deviation, and a second pilot was occupied with non-essential phone activity at a critical moment. Read the ATSB investigation. ATSB
Safety lesson: Ensure the whole bridge team understands the pilotage plan. Compare orders, heading, rate of turn and position with that plan, and challenge deviations immediately.
6. Florence Spirit and Alanis: bank effect in a narrow canal
In July 2020, Florence Spirit and Alanis collided in Canada’s Welland Canal, seriously damaging both hulls. The TSB found that brief, informal messages between one master and the other vessel’s pilot influenced speed and course decisions without properly involving the bridge team. Florence Spirit approached the meeting at the maximum permissible speed of 9.9 knots and moved close to the bank. Hydrodynamic forces caused an uncontrollable sheer to port into Alanis. Read the TSB investigation. Transportation Safety Board of Canada
Safety lesson: A permitted speed is not automatically a safe speed. In confined water, account for bank clearance, hydrodynamic forces and the room needed to recover.
7. Beijing Bridge and Saxon Onward: a shortcut changes the encounter
In January 2018, Beijing Bridge collided with fishing vessel Saxon Onward off Australia. The ATSB found that an early course alteration before a planned waypoint created a close-quarters situation. Later alterations did not resolve it in time. The fishing vessel’s watchkeeper made a substantial starboard turn after assessing a head-on encounter, but acted too late. Beijing Bridge had no dedicated night lookout. The ATSB specifically found that this absence did not prevent detection of the fishing vessel in this case, although it increased the wider risk of undetected traffic. Read the ATSB investigation. ATSB
Safety lesson: Before advancing a waypoint or taking a shortcut, reassess nearby traffic and the new closest points of approach. Make avoiding action early enough to be clear and effective.
8. Daroja and Erin Wood: neither vessel saw the risk
In August 2015, the cargo ship Daroja and bunker barge Erin Wood collided near Peterhead in daylight and good visibility. The MAIB found that neither vessel kept a proper lookout; both watchkeepers remained unaware of the collision risk and took no avoiding action. The barge was badly damaged and some fuel cargo leaked. Open upper-deck weathertight doors also allowed flooding after impact. Read the MAIB investigation. GOV.UK
Safety lesson: Good visibility does not compensate for an ineffective watch. Keep weathertight openings secured so collision damage does not cause avoidable flooding.
9. Orakai and Margriet: a trawler encounter in the North Sea
In December 2014, chemical tanker Orakai collided with beam trawler Margriet. The trawler was badly damaged and diesel escaped from a fuel tank. The MAIB found that Margriet’s watchkeeper had not seen the tanker when he altered towards it at about one nautical mile. On Orakai, the officer of the watch had left an inexperienced ordinary seaman alone on the bridge. Read the MAIB investigation. GOV.UK
Safety lesson: Fishing operations and shipping routes demand a sustained lookout. An inexperienced person should not be left to maintain a navigational watch alone.
10. Red Falcon and Phoenix: glare and blind arcs
In September 2018, passenger ferry Red Falcon collided with motor cruiser Phoenix in Southampton’s Thorn Channel. The cruiser was pinned against the ferry’s bow and badly damaged, although nobody was injured. The MAIB found that sun glare and a window-frame blind arc obscured Phoenix from the seated ferry bridge team. Sun screens had not been lowered, both vessels relied solely on visual lookout, and the cruiser’s operator did not check astern while entering the channel. Read the MAIB investigation. GOV.UK
Safety lesson: Search blind sectors actively by changing position and using available aids. Small-craft operators should check around and astern before entering a busy channel.
11. Marcliff and APL Guam: too little room to pass
In March 2019, outbound container ship Marcliff collided with inbound APL Guam in Yokohama, then struck anchored Hansa Steinburg. The NTSB found that Marcliff’s master attempted to pass between the inbound ship and the anchored vessel without sufficient manoeuvring room. Poor communication between bridge teams and the pilot about intentions contributed to the accident. Read the NTSB investigation. ntsb.gov
Safety lesson: Identify the available escape margin before committing to a passing plan in restricted harbour space. Communicate intentions early while continuing to assess what the other vessels actually do.
12. Kota Wajar and Blazing Keel: a ship and yacht fail to detect each other
In July 2014, container ship Kota Wajar and yacht Blazing Keel collided in Moreton Bay in clear visibility. Neither vessel detected the other before impact. The ATSB found that neither maintained a proper lookout. The ship lacked the dedicated lookout required by its procedures; radar use, workload and shore background lights also featured in the investigation. The yacht was extensively damaged, but both people aboard survived. Read the ATSB investigation. ATSB
Safety lesson: Ships and small craft share coastal channels. Maintain a visual lookout, use radar appropriately and take early action when a risk develops.
The recurring causes: what should bridge teams notice?
| Pattern in the reports | Operational meaning |
|---|---|
| Weak or absent lookout | Traffic is detected late, or one person becomes overloaded. |
| Incomplete collision-risk assessment | A target is seen, but its bearing, range or changing movement is not acted on. |
| Small or late manoeuvres | Sea room disappears and the other vessel may struggle to interpret the action. |
| Overreliance on AIS or VHF | Labels and conversations create confidence that the actual tracks do not support. |
| Poor bridge coordination | Pilot, master, officer of the watch and helmsman do not share or check the same plan. |
| Treating safe speed as a fixed number | Traffic, visibility, stopping distance and confined-water effects may make a permitted speed unsuitable. |
| Weak preparation for damage | Open doors or a delayed damage assessment can increase the consequences after impact. |
The IMO overview of the COLREGs connects these lessons to Rule 5 on lookout, Rule 6 on safe speed, Rule 7 on collision-risk assessment and Rule 8 on avoiding action. Rule 19 addresses conduct in restricted visibility. The rule governing a particular encounter depends on its circumstances; it cannot be determined from an AIS label or a brief radio call alone. imo.org
A practical collision-prevention routine
- Detect: Maintain a proper lookout by sight, hearing and appropriate instruments. Search sectors hidden by bridge structures or glare.
- Assess: Track relevant targets early. Check bearing, range, closest point of approach and time to closest point of approach; reassess after changes of course or speed.
- Apply the appropriate rules: Identify the actual visibility, traffic scheme and encounter. Do not assume visual crossing rules govern a restricted-visibility situation.
- Act in time: Make a clear, effective manoeuvre when required, then verify that the passing distance is increasing without creating another close-quarters situation.
- Share the plan: Align the master, pilot, officer of the watch, lookout and helmsman on intended track, wheel-over points, traffic and contingency actions.
- Call for help early: Additional bridge support is most useful while there is still room to manoeuvre.
- Respond after impact: Raise the alarm, account for people, assess damage and watertight integrity, preserve voyage data recorder information and contact the relevant authorities.
Frequently asked questions
What is the difference between a collision and an allision?
A collision commonly describes contact between vessels. An allision commonly describes a vessel striking a fixed object such as a pier, although terminology varies. Maersk Shekou is included here because it struck a berthed vessel as well as a wharf.
Does AIS replace visual lookout or radar?
No. AIS is one source of information, and some small craft do not transmit it. Bridge teams must use the means appropriate to the conditions, including visual observation, radar and plotting. imo.org
Is a VHF passing agreement enough?
No. A call can clarify intentions, but it can also be misunderstood. Continue monitoring the vessels’ actual movements and take the action required by the circumstances and the COLREGs.
Where can readers find the full reports?
Each case above links to its investigating authority’s record. The IMO GISIS investigation-report page explains access to reports submitted through its Marine Casualties and Incidents module. Read the full authority report before using a case for formal training: a short article cannot reproduce every qualification or finding. www.imo.org
Conclusion
The central lesson of these investigations is that seeing another vessel and understanding the encounter are separate tasks. Effective lookout, continuing risk assessment, timely action, safe speed and a shared bridge plan must carry through until the vessels are safely past and clear.
