The Saudi-UAE Rivalry and the Battle for Regional Leadership

In late December 2025, the long-simmering rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates erupted into open conflict, not in a border skirmish, but in the devastated landscape of Yemen. Forces backed by the UAE swept across six southern governorates, seizing territory along Saudi Arabia’s border. Within days, Saudi airstrikes and Saudi-backed troops erased these gains. This unprecedented direct military confrontation marked a watershed moment in Middle Eastern geopolitics, exposing a deep and widening chasm between the two Gulf powers whose cooperation had defined the region for over a decade.

This article argues that the struggle for primacy between Saudi Arabia and the UAE is not merely a diplomatic spat but a fundamental clash of strategic visions, risk tolerance, and models of power. Saudi Arabia, the traditional heavyweight, seeks to consolidate a state-centric regional order to safeguard its ambitious domestic transformation. Meanwhile, the UAE, a nimmer and wealthier challenger, pursues a strategy of pre-emptive intervention and fragmentation to build a security architecture that ensures its survival and prosperity independent of its larger neighbor. This rivalry is reshaping conflicts from Yemen to Sudan, reconfiguring economic and logistical networks, and forcing global powers to recalculate their approach to the Gulf.

–

Table: Core Strategic Doctrines: Saudi Arabia vs. UAE

–

1. The Strategic Fault Line: Diverging Visions of Order and Risk

The heart of the Saudi-Emirati divergence lies in opposing answers to a fundamental question: what constitutes the greater threat to national security—intervention or inaction? Saudi Arabia’s strategy is one of calculated consolidation. As a large continental state, it views the region as “basically manageable,” prioritizing de-escalation and border insulation to protect its unprecedented domestic transformation under Vision 2030. Riyadh operates on the conviction that “imperfect states are not the problem—the problem is state collapse”. A failed state creates vacuums for militias and terrorists, producing refugees and instability that could spill across its vast borders. Consequently, Saudi policy aims to shore up existing state institutions, even weak ones, and preserve internationally recognized borders as the foundation of regional order.

In stark contrast, the UAE, a smaller federation of city-states, perceives the region through a lens of vulnerability and opportunity. Its doctrine of pre-emptive activism is born from a belief that the regional order is so brittle that leaving it unattended guarantees deterioration. From Abu Dhabi’s perspective, Iran and its allies, as well as Islamist political groups, are actively corrosive forces. Waiting for threats to fully manifest is a luxury it cannot afford. Therefore, the UAE seeks to reshape political landscapes proactively, often by supporting sub-state actors, separatist movements, or particular militias that can create favorable, controllable realities on the ground. This is not framed as a rivalry with Riyadh, but as the pursuit of essential “strategic autonomy”.

–

2. Proxy Battlefields: From Yemen to the Horn of Africa

This strategic clash has turned multiple regional crises into proxy arenas where Saudi and Emirati interests violently collide.

 Yemen: The Rupture Point

Yemen is the most vivid and consequential theater of this competition. Both nations intervened in 2015 to oust the Houthi movement, but their objectives soon diverged. Saudi Arabia focused on defeating the Houthis and preserving a unified Yemeni state to prevent a hostile entity on its southern flank. The UAE, however, gradually deprioritized the northern war, concentrating instead on backing the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a secessionist group seeking an independent South Yemen.

For years, this contradiction was managed. However, in December 2025, the STC’s “Promising Future” offensive crossed a Saudi red line by capturing oil-rich provinces along the Saudi border. Riyadh viewed this as an existential threat, suspecting the UAE of greenlighting the move. The response was swift and severe: Saudi airstrikes targeted the STC-held Port of Mukalla, and Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces rolled back all the separatist gains, leading to the STC’s effective dissolution by January 2026. This episode transformed Yemen from a shared project into a direct Saudi-UAE battleground, with Riyadh now working to systematically dismantle Emirati proxy networks in the country.

The Horn of Africa and Sudan: Scrambling for the Red Sea

The competition extends to the critical waterways of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, a zone of vital importance for trade and security. Here, the UAE’s strategy of building relationships with breakaway regions and non-state militias directly clashes with Saudi (and broader Arab) efforts to bolster central governments.

Somalia: The UAE has cultivated deep economic and military ties with the breakaway region of Somaliland, developing its port of Berbera. Saudi Arabia, aligning with the federal government in Mogadishu and Egypt, rejects any move toward Somaliland’s recognition and supports Somali unity. In late 2025, after Israel’s controversial recognition of Somaliland, Mogadishu canceled its port agreements with the UAE—a move seen as a victory for the Saudi-Egyptian position.

Sudan: In Sudan’s civil war, Saudi Arabia backs the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the official national army. The UAE, however, is repeatedly accused by UN experts and the Sudanese government of providing extensive military support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group. Riyadh reportedly views this as undermining a fellow Arab state’s stability and is countering by financing arms purchases for the SAF from Pakistan.

–

Conflict Zone	Saudi Arabia’s Priority	UAE’s Priority	Nature of Rivalry
Yemen	Preserve state unity, contain Houthis, secure border.	Empower southern separatists (STC), secure maritime chokepoints.	Direct proxy confrontation; competing visions for Yemen’s future.
Horn of Africa	Support internationally recognized governments (Somalia).	Cultivate commercial/military ports (Somaliland, Eritrea).	Competition for strategic port access and political influence.
Sudan	Ceasefire, stability, preserve state institutions.	Back Rapid Support Forces (RSF) against “Islamist” elements.	Competing proxies; differing narratives on source of extremism.
Israe.l-Palestine	Normalization contingent on Palestinian statehood.	Full normalization and strategic partnership with Israe.l.	Ideological and diplomatic rift over a core Arab identity issue.

 

3. Economic and Logistical Rivalry: Visions of the Future

Beyond the battlefield, the two nations are locked in a high-stakes competition to define the Gulf’s economic future, pivoting from an oil-based paradigm to one built on tourism, logistics, technology, and global connectivity.

Tourism, Culture,  Global Events, and Aviation Race

Tourism is a key battleground in the post-oil vision. The UAE, particularly Dubai, is the established leader, renowned for luxury shopping, iconic architecture, and major events. Saudi Arabia, however, is the fastest-growing major tourism destination in the world, with international visitor numbers skyrocketing by over 100% in early 2025 compared to pre-pandemic levels. It is leveraging a different appeal: the untapped historical and religious sites of AlUla and Diriyah, and the transformation of Jeddah’s coastline. The competition extends to sports and culture. Both nations are investing billions in sports teams, tournaments, and entertainment to boost soft power and tourism. From Formula One races and world-title boxing matches to acquiring football clubs and hosting mega-concerts, the Gulf has become a center of the global sports and entertainment industry, with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi often competing for the same events and assets.

Both nations have launched monumental projects to capture the global tourism and transit market.

• Saudi Arabia’s Giga-Vision: Under Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia is undertaking the world’s most ambitious tourism build-out. Projects like the $500 billion futuristic city NEOM, the luxury Red Sea resorts, and the cultural destination AlUla aim to attract 100 million visitors annually by 2030. To support this, it is not just expanding airports but creating a new national airline, Riyadh Air, to challenge the Gulf’s established carriers and funnel traffic through the capital.

• UAE’s Entrenched Hub Status: The UAE, particularly Dubai, is the incumbent titan. It welcomed 16.7 million tourists in 2019 and aims for 23-25 million by 2025. Dubai’s strength lies in its mature ecosystem—its globally connected airlines (Emirates and flydubai), world-class shopping and entertainment, and its ability to quickly adapt. It is responding to the Saudi challenge by expanding Al Maktoum International Airport to become the world’s largest.

The Battle for Trade and Logistics Supremacy

Control over the movement of goods is equally critical. The GCC freight and logistics market is projected to grow from $81.34 billion in 2025 to $116.14 billion by 2031.

Saudi Arabia’s Land Bridge: Saudi strategy is continental and integrative, focusing on internal connectivity. Massive investments in ports like NEOM and King Abdulaziz, coupled with the Etihad Rail network, are designed to create seamless multimodal corridors across the Kingdom, linking the Red Sea to the Gulf and positioning Saudi Arabia as the indispensable land bridge for regional trade.

UAE’s Maritime and Digital Dominance: The UAE leverages its geographic head start and expertise. DP World’s global port empire, centered on Jebel Ali in Dubai, remains the region’s premier transshipment hub. The UAE complements this physical infrastructure with digital innovation, such as advanced customs platforms, to streamline trade. Its goal is to remain the region’s primary gateway, making bypassing its ports and airports economically unfeasible.

Table: Economic & Logistical Competition

 Logistics, Trade, and Aviation Hubs

The UAE has established a commanding, first-mover advantage as the region’s premier nexus for global trade and logistics. Dubai’s Jebel Ali Port is the largest man-made harbor in the Middle East, and the UAE’s overall port capacity recently surpassed 100 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs). Its airports in Dubai and Abu Dhabi are global aviation crossroads. This infrastructure is supported by highly developed free zones, 100% foreign ownership laws, and a streamlined business environment that has attracted countless multinational corporations to establish their regional headquarters there. Saudi Arabia is mounting a colossal effort to catch up and leverage its inherent advantages: a much larger domestic population (over 32 million vs. the UAE’s ~9.5 million) and geographic position as a continental bridge. The focus is on mega-projects and regulatory overhaul. NEOM, the $500 billion futuristic city, is the flagship, but parallel giga-projects like the Red Sea tourism destination and Qiddiya entertainment city aim to create new economic sectors. Crucially, Saudi Arabia has begun requiring international companies to move their regional headquarters to Riyadh to secure government contracts, a direct challenge to the UAE’s corporate hub status.

Energy and the Green Transition

Even in their traditional domain of energy, new frontiers of competition are opening. While both remain petroleum giants, they are rivals within OPEC+ and are now racing to lead the energy transition. Saudi Arabia aims to be a global powerhouse in blue and green hydrogen. The UAE, having successfully launched the Barakah nuclear energy plant, is also investing heavily in renewables and has positioned itself as the host of COP28, seeking to shape the global climate agenda. This “green race” is about future economic leadership and securing a place in the next global energy system.

Table: Economic Competition: Saudi Arabia vs. UAE

–

4. Diplomatic Arenas and Global Alignment

The rivalry plays out distinctly in diplomatic theaters, revealing different philosophies of engagement and alliance-building.

The Palestinian Question and Relations with Israel

Perhaps the most symbolic divergence is on Israe.l and Palestine. The UAE, as a signatory of the Abraham Accords, has full diplomatic relations with Israe.l and has developed significant economic and security ties. It frames this as a pragmatic peace and a strategic partnership against common threats. Saudi Arabia has taken a principled and pan-Arab stance, insisting that normalization with Israe.l is contingent on the establishment of a viable Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, in line with the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, which it authored. The war in Gaza has hardened this position, with Riyadh leading Arab diplomatic efforts to demand a ceasefire and a political path forward. The UAE’s close alignment with Israe.l is viewed in Riyadh as undercutting Saudi diplomatic leadership on the most emotionally resonant issue in Arab politics.

Building External Security Networks

Facing perceived American retrenchment, both are constructing their own external security partnerships, but with different partners and purposes.

• Saudi Arabia’s State-Centric Alliances: Riyadh is forging defense pacts with Pakistan and potentially Turkey, framed as mutual protection agreements. It is also reportedly working on a Saudi-Egypt-Somalia alignment aimed at curbing Emirati influence in the Red Sea. These moves aim to complement US security guarantees and deter regional adversaries, including Israel.

• UAE’s Niche Partnership Model: The UAE has cultivated a strategic triangle with Israel and India, centered on technology, maritime security, and economic connectivity. This partnership, including participation in the US-backed “I2U2” group, focuses on building interdependence and soft power rather than formal military blocs.

–

5. Society, Innovation, and the Northern Power: Iran

Notably, on the overarching threat of Iran, Saudi and Emirati interests converge—but their tactics differ. Both view a destabilized Iran as a direct threat to Gulf security, energy exports, and their economic visions. During the January 2026 protests in Iran, Gulf monarchies, including both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, engaged in “phone diplomacy” to urge Washington against military strikes on Tehran, fearing catastrophic regional escalation.

However, their day-to-day approaches differ. Saudi Arabia, after years of confrontation, has embarked on a Chinese-brokered détente with Iran, focusing on diplomatic de-escalation. The UAE, while also pursuing diplomacy, maintains a harder security posture, closely aligning with Israel’s efforts to counter Iranian influence militarily and through intelligence, particularly in maritime domains. Leadership in the 21st century extends beyond geopolitics and economics into the realms of social influence, technological innovation, and the management of relations with regional adversaries.

Competing Models of Social Modernization

Both nations are modernizing their social contracts, but at different paces and with distinct narratives. The UAE presents itself as a cosmopolitan, tolerant, and business-friendly model where social liberalization (e.g., loosening alcohol laws, promoting interfaith dialogue) is marketed as essential for economic success. Its population is overwhelmingly expatriate, creating a unique, globalized social fabric. Saudi Arabia’s social transformation under MBS is more dramatic because it started from a more conservative baseline. Reforms like empowering women to drive, opening cinemas, and curbing the religious police are revolutionary in the Saudi context. However, this transformation is coupled with an unprecedented centralization of political power and a strict limit on political expression. The Saudi narrative frames this as a reclamation of moderate Islam and a nationalist project for a vibrant society under a powerful leadership.

The Race for Technological Leadership

Recognizing that future power will be digital, both states are making massive sovereign wealth fund bets on artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and space. The UAE has often been quicker to deploy emerging technologies—appointing a Minister of AI, launching a Mars probe, and positioning itself as a testbed for autonomous transportation. Saudi Arabia, through the Public Investment Fund (PIF), is making larger financial investments in global tech firms and building the physical and digital infrastructure (data centers, computing power) to support a tech ecosystem, with a keen eye on serving its larger population.

Managing Iran: A Shared Challenge with Different Approaches

Iran is the enduring strategic challenge for both Gulf Arab states, but their tactics reveal another layer of rivalry. For years, both subscribed to a united front of containment and confrontation against Iranian influence in the region. This unity has fractured. Saudi Arabia has embarked on a pragmatic diplomatic recalibration. With Chinese mediation, it restored diplomatic ties with Iran in 2023. Riyadh’s calculus is driven by several factors: a desire to extricate itself from costly conflicts like Yemen, a need for regional stability to facilitate Vision 2030, and a perception of waning U.S. security guarantees. The Kingdom hopes that engagement, backed by China’s leverage, can mitigate threats more effectively than pure confrontation. The UAE has taken a more nuanced, bilateral approach. It never severed diplomatic ties with Iran to the degree Saudi Arabia did and has actively engaged in economic diplomacy and de-escalation on maritime security, even while opposing Iran’s actions in Yemen and elsewhere. Abu Dhabi seems to favor a compartmentalized strategy: managing its direct relationship with Tehran for trade and security while continuing to counter its proxies regionally, often in alignment with Israel. This creates a complex dynamic where the two Gulf allies are no longer perfectly synchronized in their primary strategic confrontation, each seeking its own path to manage the “northern power.”

–

Conclusion: An Unstable Duopoly and the Future of the Gulf

The question of who leads the southern Persian Gulf no longer has a single answer. The region is now characterized by an unstable and competitive duopoly. Saudi Arabia possesses the unmatched scale, religious authority, and diplomatic weight of a traditional regional leader. The UAE wields disproportionate influence through financial muscle, agility, and a network of globalized partnerships.

Their rivalry is structurally embedded, rooted in incompatible strategic cultures. Saudi Arabia’s vision is one of consolidation and centralized order; the UAE’s is one of fragmentation and networked power. This ensures competition will persist across every domain: in the political futures of fractured states like Yemen and Sudan; in the race to attract tourists, companies, and shipping routes; and in the alignment of external powers.

For the United States and other external actors, this means the old playbook of dealing with a unified Gulf bloc is obsolete. Washington now must balance two key partners who are increasingly at odds, leveraging relationships with both to secure interests from energy to counterterrorism. For the smaller GCC states and regional actors, it creates a precarious environment where navigating between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi becomes a constant diplomatic necessity.

The events in Yemen in December 2025 proved that this rivalry can turn hot. The greatest risk is that a miscalculation in one of these overlapping zones of competition—be it in the Red Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, or within a collapsing state—could escalate beyond a proxy conflict, fundamentally destabilizing the region. The battle for the Gulf is no longer about who sits at the head of the table, but about who gets to build the table—and according to which design.