By 2024–2025, nearly all Russia–China trade is settled in yuan and rubles. A deep shift in payments, shipping logistics, and energy corridors is reshaping Eurasian trade.
Russia–China economic relations entered an unprecedented phase in 2024–2025. What began as an emergency workaround to sanctions evolved into a stable settlement architecture held together by two currencies: the Chinese renminbi (RMB) and the Russian ruble.
Over 90% of bilateral trade today is invoiced in either RMB or rubles, not in US dollars or euros. The speed of this transition is astonishing. Before 2022, yuan usage in Russian foreign trade was negligible. By 2024, it became the primary clearing currency. By 2025, Moscow and Beijing began framing it as the backbone of their strategic partnership.
For global shipping, ports, banks, energy traders, and insurers, this shift is not symbolic—it is operational. RMB–ruble flows now support oil cargoes across the Pacific, LNG voyages from Arctic terminals, container movements through Vladivostok, and automotive exports across the Sino–Russian border.
This is no longer merely trade. It is a two-currency logistics and financial ecosystem binding the Eurasian landmass from the Baltic to Shanghai.
Why RMB–Ruble Dynamics Matter for Maritime Operations
For the maritime sector, the Russia–China financial realignment translates directly into route stability and asset deployment.
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Tanker voyages from Primorsk, Novorossiysk, Kozmino, and Murmansk feed directly into Chinese refineries.
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Containers filled with Chinese automotive parts, electronics, and machinery stream into Vladivostok and Russia’s Far East by sea and rail.
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LNG and Arctic fuel cargoes bridge China’s rising winter consumption and Russia’s year-round polar capacity.
Freight, bunkering, and terminal expenses in some Russia–China corridors are now routinely quoted in RMB instead of dollars. Marine insurers and P&I clubs are adjusting underwriting rules to reflect this reality. Port authorities in Russia are increasingly equipped to accept RMB-denominated fees, especially in Far East terminals.
Where currency changes, logistics confidence changes.
The Rise of RMB in Russia’s Trade System
From Minor Currency to Dominant Settlement Tool
Until 2022, RMB played a marginal role in Russia’s financial system. By late 2024:
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The yuan became the most actively traded currency on the Moscow Exchange.
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Russian banks held more RMB assets than US dollars.
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Energy exporters adopted RMB as the default invoicing unit for seaborne crude, LNG, and refined petroleum.
This was not a symbolic pivot—it was survival architecture. Once Russian banks were cut off from dollar correspondent channels, RMB became the platform through which Russia could continue high-volume energy trade and access manufactured goods.
Banking Architecture and Swap Lines
Between 2024 and 2025, liquidity arrangements were expanded, swap lines deepened, and Moscow–Beijing financial corridors began using enhanced clearing pathways insulated from Western compliance networks.
The system is not seamless, but it is functional—and increasingly permanent.
2025: Stability of Currency, Fragility of Trade Volume
By early 2025, nearly all Russia–China transactions were being settled in national currencies. Yet this success coincided with weakening trade volumes.
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Chinese automotive and machinery exports to Russia began to contract.
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Sanctions pressure increased compliance complexity in major Chinese banks.
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Some payments were delayed, not because of currency constraints but because transaction screening tightened.
Thus, RMB–ruble settlement solved the dependency problem, not the economic imbalance problem.
Russia still sells commodities.
China still supplies finished goods.
Currency localization has not altered structural asymmetry—it has only made it sanctions-resistant.
Impact on Energy and Maritime Logistics
Energy remains the defining pillar:
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Seaborne crude and maritime LNG dominate freight flows.
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China is the anchor buyer of Russian hydrocarbons.
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Russian shipping schedules are built around Pacific refinery calendars and Chinese inland consumption.
Tankers now sail predictable cycles, financed and insured outside dollar channels. Bunkering payments, demurrage settlements, and storage charges may all occur in RMB without exposing either side to sanctions-sensitive US intermediaries.
Arctic LNG corridors—once experimental—now represent a fully monetised, RMB-linked supply chain that supports Chinese winter demand and Russian year-round energy monetisation.
Multimodal RMB Corridors: Sea, Rail, Arctic
The RMB–ruble framework is not purely maritime. It is multimodal:
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Landside rail corridors between Heilongjiang province and Russia’s Siberian hubs.
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Pacific port expansions at Vladivostok, Vostochny, and Nakhodka.
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The Northern Sea Route (NSR) increasingly tied to Chinese shipbuilding, ice-class support, and Arctic logistics finance.
A fully integrated Eurasian logistics spine now exists, held together financially by RMB clearance instead of dollar dominance.
What used to be a pipeline-plus-port relationship is now a corridor of linked currencies, shipyards, railheads, and refinery networks.
Systemic Challenges Beneath the Stability
1. Compliance Overhang
Chinese banks avoid US secondary sanctions exposure. Result: payment channels open, but screening delays remain.
2. Liquidity Tension
Heavy yuan demand inside Russia periodically strains offshore RMB pools and ruble liquidity, especially during seasonal peaks of oil invoicing.
3. Strategic Dependence
Russia’s manufacturing base remains reliant on Chinese supply chains. Local-currency settlement masks—but does not resolve—the industrial dependency gap.
4. Maritime Insurance Complexity
Insurers reassess exposure not just by flag or route, but by counterparty bank, currency origin, and sanctions legality.
Future Outlook: The Eurasian Currency Model
By 2030, RMB–ruble trade is expected to stabilize as a long-term currency bloc. Its implications extend beyond Moscow and Beijing:
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LNG tankers financing may increasingly shift to RMB capital markets.
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Ruble-denominated port fees could become routine in Vladivostok and Murmansk.
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China may expand shipbuilding cooperation tied to Arctic commercial lanes.
The world’s maritime map will slowly reflect this currency shift.
Freight flows will mirror RMB liquidity cycles.
Energy contracts will bypass dollar benchmarks.
Port cities from Dalian to Vladivostok will become clearing chambers for Eurasian commerce.
If the past two years reshaped payments, the next decade will reshape trade corridors.
FAQ
1. How much of Russia–China trade uses national currencies?
As of 2024–2025, nearly all bilateral settlements operate in RMB and rubles.
2. Does this eliminate sanctions exposure?
No. Currency localization prevents dollar interruption but does not remove compliance risks.
3. What sectors dominate the trade relationship?
Energy from Russia; manufactured industrial goods, vehicles, and electronics from China.
4. Does RMB settlement affect maritime shipping?
Yes. Freight, bunkering, insurance, and port dues increasingly use RMB invoicing.
5. Will the trade imbalance change?
Currency reform alone cannot rebalance structure; Russia remains commodity-heavy.
Conclusion
Russia and China have created the world’s most significant de-dollarised bilateral trade corridor. RMB–ruble settlement now powers oil tankers, LNG carriers, container flows, and Arctic fleet planning. It is not temporary improvisation—it is structural financial scaffolding for Eurasia’s largest trade route.
Maritime actors must adjust to local-currency pricing, sanctions-sensitive banking, and RMB-driven port financing. The Russia–China partnership has moved beyond diplomacy into the logistics bloodstream of world commerce, and shipping lanes are now its most visible arteries.
References
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Bank of Russia. Foreign Trade and Settlement Reports, 2024–2025.
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China General Administration of Customs. Bilateral Trade Bulletin, 2023–2024.
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Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China. Trade Settlement Statements, 2024.
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Russian Ministry of Economic Development. Yuan Settlement Adoption Report, 2024.
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Moscow Exchange. Currency Trading Composition Statistics, 2024–2025.
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PBOC (People’s Bank of China). RMB Liquidity and Swap Line Data, 2024.
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MERICS. China–Russia Dashboard: Payment and Settlement Architecture, 2024–2025.
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Reuters. Russia–China Trade Flows and Yuan Settlement Coverage, 2023–2025.
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Lloyd’s List Intelligence. Arctic and Pacific Energy Shipping Outlook, 2024.
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Clarksons Research. Eurasian Maritime Forecast: LNG and Tanker Patterns, 2024–2025.
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SWP Berlin. Industrial Dependency in Sino–Russian Supply Chains, 2024.