Arab States of Persian Gulf: Public Neutrality, Private Partnerships With the USA Against Iran – Jan 2026

01/31/2026

The first month of 2026 has crystallized a perilous contradiction in the Persian Gulf: by continuing to provide critical, behind-the-scenes support for U.S. military power while pleading public neutrality, Arab Gulf states are not preventing a war but ensuring they will become its primary battlefield. Their foundational infrastructure and hard-won economic future stand directly in the crosshairs of a conflict they are helping to enable, risking a retaliatory inferno from Iran that will rewrite the regional order.

 Hosting the Arsenal, Inviting the Fire

In late January 2026, the geopolitical maneuvering in the Persian Gulf reached a moment of stark transparency. As the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group steamed into the region, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia issued explicit public declarations: they would not allow U.S. military actions against Iran to originate from their soil or airspace. These statements, however, ring hollow against the undeniable, entrenched reality of sprawling U.S. bases, ports, and intelligence installations that dot their territories. This is not a strategy of peace; it is a catastrophic gamble. Arab Gulf states are attempting to reap the security benefits of the U.S. alliance while publicly sidestepping the blame, but in doing so, they are constructing the very conditions for their own devastation. Should Washington’s tensions with Tehran erupt into open conflict, the flames of that war will not be contained. They will burn first and fiercest across the Gulf’s own oil fields, ports, financial hubs, and cities. Iran has made clear that any nation hosting the machinery for an attack will be considered a complicit enemy and will receive an answer so decisive it will serve as an eternal warning: never again ally with the enemies of Iran.

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The January 2026 Flashpoint: Public Denials and Military Buildups

The recent statements by the UAE and Saudi Arabia are not ambiguous. The UAE Foreign Ministry emphasized “dialogue and de-escalation” as the cornerstone of regional policy, directly ruling out the use of its territory for hostile action against Iran. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman delivered the same message directly to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.

These declarations serve multiple strategic purposes: they are a direct signal to Tehran to deter retaliation, an attempt to placate domestic populations wary of being dragged into conflict, and an effort to position these nations as indispensable mediators rather than belligerents.

Concurrently, a significant U.S. naval force, including the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group and several guided-missile destroyers, has been deployed to the region. President Trump has framed this “beautiful armada” as both pressure and an opening for diplomacy with Iran. Iran’s response has been characteristically stark, unveiling propaganda murals of destroyed U.S. carriers and warning through its network of proxies, like Iraq’s Kataeb Hezbollah, of “all-out war” if attacked.

The Strategic Calculus: Why the Gulf States Play Both Sides

This public-private divergence is a calculated survival strategy, not mere hypocrisy. Gulf leaders are navigating a triad of existential imperatives.

• Imperative 1: The Unavoidable U.S. Security Umbrella. Despite the public refusals, the fundamental need for a U.S. security guarantee against Iran has not changed. The U.S. Navy is still seen as the ultimate guarantor of safe passage for Gulf hydrocarbons. Expelling U.S. forces would create a dangerous vacuum that Gulf states’ own militaries cannot fill, potentially inviting greater Iranian assertiveness.

• Imperative 2: The Ever-Present Threat of Iranian Retaliation. The risk is not theoretical. In June 2025, Iran launched a direct missile strike on Qatar’s Al Udeid Air Base, which hosts the forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), in retaliation for U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. While Qatar claimed most missiles were intercepted, the attack demonstrated that hosting U.S. bases makes them legitimate targets in Iranian doctrine. The fallout continues; as of January 2026, Iran was notably absent from the DIMDEX defense exhibition in Qatar, with analysts suggesting its previous attack made it an unwelcome guest.

• Imperative 3: The Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy. Gulf states are painfully aware of the limits of external patronage. This has accelerated a push for greater military independence, exemplified by the recent “Gulf Shield 2026” exercise in Saudi Arabia, which involved all GCC air forces and focused on integrated air and missile defense. This drive for autonomy extends to geopolitics, as they simultaneously deepen economic ties with China, which prefers commercial competition in the region over military rivalry with the U.S..

The Military Reality: A Deeply Entrenched U.S. Footprint

Public statements cannot mask the deeply rooted, operational reality of the U.S. military presence across the Gulf. This infrastructure forms the backbone of U.S. power projection in the Middle East.

The following table outlines the scale of this entrenched presence:

Scarred by History: The Gulf’s Frontline Costs in Past Wars

During the two Persian Gulf Wars, the Arab states of the Gulf suffered profound and lasting damages that serve as a stark historical warning. In the first conflict (1990-1991), Kuwait was subjected to a full-scale Iraqi invasion and occupation, resulting in the systematic looting of its economy, the destruction of its infrastructure, and the environmental catastrophe of hundreds of oil wells set ablaze. During the liberation and the subsequent 2003 Iraq War, nations like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain served as primary staging grounds for U.S.-led coalitions. While they avoided direct invasion, they faced severe economic costs from hosting massive military deployments, sustained missile attacks on their cities, and chronic regional instability that deterred investment for a generation. These wars demonstrated that even when Gulf states are not the primary belligerents, their geography makes them vulnerable to immediate economic devastation, military retaliation, and long-term disruption—a lesson directly informing their acute fear of any new conflict with Iran.

The Persian Gulf Wars (1991 and 2003) represent two distinct but linked conflicts involving Iraq and a U.S.-led coalition. While the first war focused on restoring sovereignty after an invasion, the second aimed at regime change.

Economic Fragility: Decades of Progress on a Tinderbox

The economic cost of conflict for the Gulf states would be catastrophic, jeopardizing the very future they are trying to build. Their vulnerability is twofold: the foundational energy sector and the promising but fragile new economy.

The Core Vulnerability: Energy Infrastructure. The Strait of Hormuz remains the world’s most critical oil chokepoint. A conflict could trap the exports of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, and Iraq simultaneously. Direct attacks on infrastructure—like the 2019 strikes on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq facility or the 2025 missile strike on Al Udeid’s radar dome—could cripple production and shatter their reputation as reliable suppliers. Analysts note that while a major disruption could spike oil prices to $80-$100 per barrel, the resulting physical damage and lost market confidence would far outweigh any short-term revenue gain.

The New Vulnerability: The Diversification Miracle. The non-oil economy is now the Gulf’s growth engine. The IMF estimates non-oil GDP growth in the GCC averaged 3.7% in 2024. This new economy is built on:

• Global hubs for finance (e.g., Dubai, Doha), logistics, and tourism.
• Ambitious tech investments in AI and data centers, positioning the region as a digital hub.
• Vibrant expatriate communities and booming urban centers.

A war would incinerate this progress. Expatriates would flee, global investment would evaporate, and the urban centers driving growth would become targets. The table below contrasts the financial risks with the new economic assets at stake.

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Integrated Outlook: A Region Seeking Leverage in a Divided World

As of January 2026, the Gulf Arab states are not passive pawns. Their strategy is a high-stakes effort to convert their positional disadvantage into leverage.

• Playing the Great Powers: They are adeptly balancing American security needs with Chinese technological and commercial partnerships, while also engaging with a resurgent Turkey.

• Managing Regional Crises: They are extending their diplomatic influence, playing financial and potential security roles in Gaza reconstruction and engaging deeply in post-Assad Syria stabilization.

• The Internal Balancing Act: Rapid social modernization and economic opening, while strategically necessary, are creating domestic tensions, complicated further by regional anger over issues like Gaza.

Left: The Modernized Enterprise Terminal sits inside a Radome at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, Jan. 21, 2016. (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Joshua Strang). Right: Image showing the radome at Al Udeid completely destroyed, with the dish antenna heavily damaged. (Image via X)

On September 14, 2019, a major aerial attack targeted two of Saudi Arabia’s most critical oil processing facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais. While Yemen’s Houthi rebels immediately claimed responsibility for the strike, international investigations by the United Nations and the United States claimed that the attack originated from Iran or Iraq rather than Yemen!!

Conclusion: The Inescapable Reckoning of Strategic Complicity

The public denials issued in January 2026 will provide zero protection when the missiles fly. The Gulf Arab states’ calculated ambiguity—public neutrality paired with private, extensive logistical support—is a desperate attempt to have it both ways in a situation that offers no such luxury. The 2025 Iranian strike on Qatar’s Al Udeid Air Base was not an anomaly; it was a blueprint. In a full-scale war, the retaliatory barrage will be broader, smarter, and utterly devastating. The cherished economic diversification projects—the glittering financial towers, the AI hubs, the tourism megaprojects—are not symbols of a secure future but high-value targets in Iran’s strategic calculus. The message from Tehran is unequivocal: any platform used to attack Iran will be destroyed.

Ultimately, the Gulf’s fragile attempt to balance between a demanding ally and a powerful neighbor is collapsing under the weight of its own contradiction. By continuing to host the radars that guide U.S. jets, the ports that service American warships, and the bases that launch intelligence drones, these states are not firewalling themselves from conflict; they are signing their own economic and physical obituary. The coming conflagration will demonstrate with brutal finality that there is no middle ground. Iran’s response will be designed to be unforgettable, a searing lesson that reshapes the regional landscape for generations: the cost of enabling an attack on Iran is the incineration of your own prosperity and security. The flames of this war, should it ignite, will not distinguish between American assets and the host nations that enabled them; they will consume both, leaving the Gulf’s ambitious visions for the future in ashes.